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Abstract
We study the impact of a fully-funded social security system in an economy with 
heterogeneous consumers. The unobservability of individual health conditions leads 
to adverse selection in the private annuity market. Introducing social security—
which is immune to adverse selection—affects capital accumulation and individual 
welfare depending on its size and on the pension benefit rule that is adopted. If this 
rule incorporates some implicit or explicit redistribution from healthy to unhealthy 
individuals then the latter types are better off as a result of the pension system. In the 
absence of redistribution the public pension system makes everybody worse off in 
the long run. Though attractive to distant generations, privatization of social security 
is not generally Pareto improving to all generations.
Keywords Social security · Annuity market · Adverse selection · Inequality · 
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1 Introduction
More than half a century ago Yaari (1965) proved convincingly that private annui-
ties are very attractive insurance instruments when non-altruistic individuals face 
longevity risk. Simply put, annuities are desirable because they insure such agents 
against the risk of outliving their assets. Yaari also proved a much stronger result: in 
the absence of an intentional bequest motive, rational utility-maximizing individuals 
should fully annuitize all of their savings. Yaari derives this result under the strong 
assumption that actuarially fair annuities are available. In a more recent paper, how-
ever, Davidoff et al. (2005) have demonstrated that the full annuitization result holds 
in a much more general setting than the one adopted by Yaari, for example when 
annuities are less than actuarially fair.
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of annuities, there is a vast body of empiri-
cal evidence showing that in reality people do not invest heavily in private annu-
ity markets. The discrepancy between the theoretical predictions and the observable 
facts regarding annuity markets is know as the annuity puzzle. Of course there are 
many reasons why individuals may not choose to fully annuitize their wealth. Fried-
man and Warshawsky (1990,  pp. 136–137), for example, argue that purchases of 
private annuities are low because (a) individuals may want to leave bequests to their 
offspring, (b) agents may already implicitly hold social annuities because they are 
participating in a system of mandatory public pensions, and (c) private annuities 
may be priced unattractively, for example because of transaction costs and taxes, 
excessive profits extracted by imperfectly competitive annuity firms, and adverse 
selection. Intuitively, under asymmetric information annuity companies cannot 
observe an individual’s health status. Adverse selection arises in such a setting 
because agents with above-average health are more likely to buy annuities. This 
implies that such “high-risk types” are overrepresented in the group of clients of 
annuity firms and that pricing of annuities cannot be based on the average health 
status of the population at large.
While recognizing their potential role in accounting for parts of the annuity puz-
zle, we ignore intentional bequest motives, administrative costs, and imperfect com-
petition in this paper. Instead, we follow inter alia Abel (1986), Walliser (2000), 
Palmon and Spivak (2007), Sheshinski (2008) and Heijdra and Reijnders (2012) by 
focusing on the adverse selection channel. We approach the material sequentially by 
first demonstrating the adverse selection effect in an economy without public pen-
sions. In the next step we introduce social annuities and study the general equilib-
rium interactions between private and public annuity markets under different pen-
sion benefit rules.
Our paper is most closely related to earlier work by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012). 
They study a discrete-time overlapping generations model in which non-altruistic 
agents differ in their innate health status, which is assumed to be private informa-
tion. The private annuity market settles in a risk-pooling equilibrium in which the 
unhealthiest segment of the population experiences binding borrowing constraints 
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(because they are unable to go short on annuities) and the other agents receive a 
common yield on their annuity purchases. They also show that the introduction of a 
mandatory public pension system—though immune to adverse selection by design—
leads to a reduction in steady-state welfare, an aggravation of adverse selection in 
the private annuity market, and a reduction in the economy-wide capital intensity.
We extend the work by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012) by assuming that the indi-
viduals populating the economy differ by two dimensions of heterogeneity (health 
and ability) rather than just a single one (health). The introduction of heterogeneous 
abilities serves two purposes. First, as was shown by Walliser (2000, pp. 374–375) 
in a partial equilibrium setting, “(the simulations reveal that) between 40 and 60 
percent of the measured adverse selection is due to the positive correlation between 
income and mortality...” By incorporating health-ability heterogeneity, and by 
assuming that there is a positive correlation between the two characteristics, we are 
able to capture this reputedly important source of adverse selection in the private 
annuity market. There is a second reason why heterogeneity matters which is related 
to the type of funded public pension system that is in place. Indeed, depending on 
the details regarding pension contributions and receipts, social security systems can 
have vastly different welfare implications for consumers with different health sta-
tus and/or ability. In this paper we consider three different public pension schemes 
which differ in the degree to which they lead to (implicit or explicit) redistribution 
from healthy to unhealthy individuals.
Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, a plausibly calibrated version of the 
model reveals that, compared to the case with full information, asymmetric informa-
tion on the part of annuity companies is important quantitatively in that it causes 
substantial reductions in steady-state output per efficiency unit of labour and the 
capital intensity. The general equilibrium effects are thus shown to matter a lot. Sec-
ond, the introduction of a funded social security system reduces the capital inten-
sity and output per efficiency unit even further, more so the larger is the system, 
i.e. the higher is the replacement rate it incorporates. These results are consistent 
with Palmon and Spivak (2007) and Heijdra and Reijnders (2012). Third, privatiz-
ing social security (by abolishing the public pension system) is not generally Pareto 
improving to all generations. Indeed, in our simulations we find that healthy agents 
born at the time of the shock would have been better off if the social security system 
had not been privatized. Just as for unfunded pensions, getting rid of a pre-existing 
funded system is not an easy task to accomplish.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we set up the model 
and characterize the microeconomic choices and the resulting macroeconomic equi-
librium under full information, i.e. the hypothetical case in which insurance com-
panies can perfectly observe an individual’s characteristics. In Sect. 3 we introduce 
asymmetric information inhibiting insurance companies and show that it leads to a 
pooling equilibrium in the annuity market. In Sect. 4 we introduce a fully-funded 
social security system in which pension contributions are proportional to labour 
income during youth. We analyze three specific versions of this system which differ 
with respect to the pension receipts during old age. Section 5 considers the conse-
quences of privatizing social security. The final section concludes. Some technical 
issues are dealt with in three brief appendices.




In each period the population in the closed economy under consideration features 
two overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents. Each person can live at most 
for two periods, namely ‘youth’ (superscript y) and ‘old age’ (superscript o). Indi-
viduals are heterogenous along two exogenously given dimensions. First, they differ 
by health status which we capture by the probability of surviving into old-age. Eve-
ryone faces lifetime uncertainty at the end of the first period, and the survival prob-
ability is denoted by 휇 . This means that unhealthy people have a higher risk of dying 
and a shorter expected life span (which equals 1 + 휇 periods). Second, individuals 
differ in their working ability as proxied by innate labour productivity 휂.
We assume that consumer types are continuous and uniformly distributed on 
these two dimensions, i.e. 휇 ∈ [휇L,휇H] (such that 0 < 𝜇L < 𝜇H < 1 ) and 휂 ∈ [휂L, 휂H] 
(such that 0 < 𝜂L < 𝜂H ). Furthermore, we postulate that 휇 and 휂 are positively corre-
lated. Hence, a person in better health is more likely to possess higher working abili-
ties, and vice versa. The bivariate uniform distribution used in this paper is charac-
terized by the following probability density function:
where 휉 is a parameter regulating the correlation between 휇 and 휂 (such that 𝜉 > 0 ), 
and ?̄? and ?̄? denote the unconditional means of 휇 and 휂 , respectively. In Fig. 1 the 
distribution function is depicted in panel (a) whilst the probability density function 
is shown in panel (b). From the graph of the density function it is clear that there is 
a higher probability for healthier consumers to possess higher working abilities, and 
(1)h(𝜇, 𝜂) =
1 + 𝜉 (𝜇 − ?̄?)(𝜂 − ?̄?)
(𝜇H − 𝜇L)(𝜂H − 𝜂L)
,
ytisneD(b)noitubirtsiD(a)
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Fig. 1  Features of the distribution for 휇 and 휂 . Health and innate ability are proxied by, respectively, the 
survival probability 휇 and the labour productvity parameter 휂 . The two characteristics of an individual 
are positively correlated. The distribution H(휇, 휂) is bivariate uniform. The marginal distributions of 휇 
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vice versa. For future reference we postulate Lemma 1 which summarizes some use-
ful properties of the bivariate distribution that we employ.
Lemma 1 The distribution function for the survival probability 휇 and labour pro-
ductivity 휂 is given by:
where 휇L ≤ 휇 ≤ 휇H and 휂L ≤ 휂 ≤ 휂H . The density function is given in (1). Fur-
ther properties of the distribution are: (i) the marginal density functions are 
h휇(휇) = 1∕(휇H − 휇L) and h휂(휇) = 1∕(휂H − 휂L) ; (ii) the unconditional means 


















 and the correlation is cor(휂,휇) = 휉휎휂휎휇 ; (v) the conditional prob-
ability density functions are:
and (vi) the conditional mean of 휂 for a given 휇 is:
Proof see Supplementary Material, Appendix A.   □
From the perspective of birth, the expected lifetime utility of a person with health 
status 휇 and working ability 휂 is given by:
where Cyt (휇, 휂) and Cot+1(휇, 휂) are consumption during youth and old age, respec-
tively, 훽 is the parameter capturing pure time preference ( 0 < 𝛽 < 1 ), and U(C) is the 
felicity function:
H(휇, 휂) =
(휇 − 휇L)(휂 − 휂L)




























h𝜇(𝜇) ∫ 𝜂H𝜂L 𝜂h𝜂|𝜇(𝜂)d𝜂
h𝜇(𝜇)
= ?̄? + 𝜉𝜎2
𝜂
(𝜇 − ?̄?).





, for 휎 ≠ 1,
lnC for 휎 = 1,
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where 휎 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( 𝜎 > 0 ). Equation (2) incorpo-
rates the assumption that individuals do not have a bequest motive, i.e. utility solely 
depends on own consumption during one’s lifetime.
In this section we postulate the existence of perfect private annuities. Specifically, 
we adopt the following assumptions regarding the market for private annuities:
 (A0) Health status is public information.
 (A1) The annuity market is perfectly competitive. A large number of risk-neutral firms 
offer annuities to individuals, and annuity firms can freely enter or exit the market.
 (A2) Annuity firms do not use up any real resources.
As is explained by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, pp. 322–323), in this Full Information 
case (abbreviated as FI) each health type receives its actuarially fair rate of return and 
achieves perfect insurance against longevity risk. If Apt (휇, 휂) denotes the private annu-
ity holdings of an agent of health type 휇 then the net rate of return on annuities will be 
equal to:
where rt+1 is the net rate of return on physical capital (see also below). Since the sur-
vival rate is such that 0 < 𝜇 < 1 , it follows from (4) that rp
t+1
(휇) exceeds rt+1 so that 
all agents will completely annuitize their wealth. This classic result was first derived 
by Yaari (1965).
We assume that individuals work full time during youth and part time in old age as 
a result of a system of mandatory retirement. With full annuitization of assets the peri-
odic budget identities are given by:
where wt(휂) is the wage rate of an 휂 type in period t, 휆 is the proportion of time that 
is devoted to work in old age ( 0 < 𝜆 < 1 ), and 1 + rp
t+1
(휇) is the rate of return on 
private annuities. The periodic budget identities can be combined to obtain the con-
solidated budget constraint:
The present value of lifetime consumption (left-hand side) equals the present value 
of lifetime income (right-hand side). That is, people consume their human wealth.
Consumers choose Cyt (휇, 휂) and Cot+1(휇, 휂) in order to maximize expected lifetime 
utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (7). The optimal consumption plans and 
annuity demands are fully characterized by:




(5)Cyt (휇, 휂) + A
p
t (휇, 휂) = wt(휂),
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where we have substituted the expression for the actuarially fair annuity rate (4), and 
where Φ(휇, x) is the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime income during 
youth:
From Eqs. (8) and (9) we find that consumption during youth and old-age are both pro-
portional to human wealth. Furthermore, Eq. (10) shows that annuity demand depends 
positively on the wage income during youth and negatively on old-age labour income.
The optimal consumption choices of different types of consumers are illus-
trated in Fig. 2. To avoid cluttering the diagram we illustrate the choices made by 
the four extreme types, unhealthy and healthy lowest-skilled (휇L, 휂L) and (휇H , 휂L) , 
and unhealthy and healthy highest-skilled (휇L, 휂H) and (휇H , 휂H) . For a given work-
ing ability type 휂i , the line labelled LBC(휇L, 휂i) and LBC(휇H , 휂i) are the lifetime 
budget constraints as given in (7). For skill type 휂L the income endowment point 
(wt(휂), 휆wt+1(휂)) is located at point EL . With perfect annuities, LBC(휇L, 휂i) is steeper 





































(11)Φ(휇, x) ≡ 1
1 + (휇훽)휎x휎−1
.
Fig. 2  Consumption-saving choices under full information. LBC(휇i, 휂j) is the lifetime budget constraint 
for an individual with survival probability 휇i and productivity level 휂j . IEL is the income endowment line 
and agents are located on the line segment ELEH . MRSC is the consumption Euler equation under perfect 
information with actuarially fair annuities at the individual level. Optimal consumption for individual 
(휇i, 휂j) is located at the intersection of MRSC and LBC(휇i, 휂j) . All individuals purchase annuities
184 B. J. Heijdra et al.
1 3
In the presence of perfect annuities and under full annuitization, the consumption 
Euler equation is given by:
where we have used (4) to get from the first to the second equality. The crucial thing to 
note is that all agents equate the marginal rate of substitution between current and future 
consumption to the gross interest factor on capital. Intuitively, as was first pointed out by 
Yaari (1965), the mortality rate drops out of the expression characterizing the life-cycle 
profile of consumption because agents are fully insured against the unpleasant aspects of 
lifetime uncertainty. For the homothetic felicity function (3) it is easy to show that (12) 
is a ray from the origin—see the locus labelled MRSC in Fig. 2. Optimal choices are 
located at the intersection of MRSC and the relevant lifetime budget constraint. It fol-
lows that types (휇L, 휂L) and (휇H , 휂L) consume at points A and B respectively.
What about the choices made by the highest-ability types? Given the specifica-
tion of technology adopted below, it follows that wt(휂) = 휂wt and wt+1(휂) = 휂wt+1 
so that income endowment points lie along the ray from the origin labelled IEL. 
Furthermore, it follows from (7) that LBC(휇L, 휂H) is parallel to LBC (휇L, 휂L) whilst 
LBC(휇H , 휂H) is parallel to LBC(휇H , 휂L) . Hence types (휇L, 휂H) and (휇H , 휂H) consume 
at points C and D respectively.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the microeconomic behaviour discussed 
in this subsection. First, in this closed economy featuring a positive capital stock 
(see below) all agents are net savers, i.e. everybody expresses a positive demand for 
private annuities, Apt (𝜇, 𝜂) > 0 for all 휇 and 휂 . This result follows readily from Fig. 2 
because the MRSC line lies to the left of the IEL line. Second, for a given value of 
agent productivity 휂 , the demand for annuities is increasing in the survival prob-
ability 휇 , i.e. 𝜕Apt (𝜇, 𝜂)∕𝜕𝜇 > 0 . Intuitively, healthy people buy more annuities than 
do unhealthy people of the same skill category because they expect to live longer a 
priori. Again this result follows readily from Fig. 2 because LBC(휇L, 휂i) is steeper 
than LBC(휇H , 휂i) . Third, the demand for annuities is increasing in the skill level, i.e. 
𝜕A
p
t (𝜇, 𝜂)∕𝜕𝜂 > 0 . This can be see graphically in Fig. 2 and can be proved formally 
by noting that Apt (휇, 휂) in (10) is linear in 휂.
2.2  Demography
Let Lt denote the size of the population cohort born at time t. The density of con-
sumers with health type 휇 and working ability 휂 is thus:
where the density function h(휇, 휂) is stated in (1) above. The density of (young and 















= 1 + rt+1,
(13)Lt(휇, 휂) ≡ h(휇, 휂)Lt,
(14)Pt(휇) ≡ 휇 �
휂H
휂L
Lt−1(휇, 휂)d휂 + �
휂H
휂L
Lt(휇, 휂)d휂 = 휇h휇(휇)Lt−1 + h휇(휇)Lt,
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where h휇(휇) is the marginal distribution of 휇 [see Lemma 1(i)]. If newborn cohort 
sizes evolves according to Lt = (1 + n)Lt−1 (with n > −1 ), the total population at 
time t is given by:
where ?̄? ≡ ∫ 𝜇H
𝜇L
𝜇h𝜇(𝜇)d𝜇 is the average survival rate of a newborn cohort.
2.3  Production
We assume that perfect competition prevails in the goods market. The technology is 
represented by the following Cobb–Douglas production function:
where Yt is total production, Kt is the aggregate capital stock, 휀 is the efficiency 
parameter of capital ( 0 < 𝜀 < 1 ), Ω0 is total factor productivity (assumed to be con-
stant), and Nt is the effective labor force, which is defined as:
Note that Nt has the dimension of worker efficiency (denoted by 휂 ) times number of 
working hours. By using (13) in (17) and noting that Lt = (1 + n)Lt−1 we find that 
Nt∕Lt can be written as:




 is the (positive) covariance between 휇 and 휂 [see 
Lemma 1(iv)].
By defining yt ≡ Yt∕Nt and kt ≡ Kt∕Nt , the intensive-form production function 
can be written as:
Firms choose efficiency units of labour and the capital stock such that profits are 
maximized. This optimization problem gives the following factor demand equations:
where rt is the net rate of return on physical capital, 훿 is the depreciation rate of capi-
tal ( 0 < 𝛿 < 1 ), and wt is the rental rate on efficiency units of labour. With perfect 
substitutability of efficiency units of labour, the wage rate of a 휂 type worker, wt(휂) , 





1 + n + ?̄?
1 + n
Lt,



















(19)yt = Ω0k휀t .
(20)rt + 훿 = 휀Ω0k휀−1t ,
(21)wt = (1 − 휀)Ω0k휀t ,
(22)wt(휂) = 휂wt,
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2.4  Equilibrium
The model is completed by a description of the macroeconomic equilibrium. Since 
all annuity purchases are invested in the capital market we find that:
where Apt (휇, 휂) is given in (10) above. Intuitively, Eq.  (23) says that next period’s 
aggregate capital stock is equal to total savings in the current period (consisting 
of private annuities). By substituting the demand for annuities (10) and the wage 
equation (22) into (23) we obtain the fundamental difference equation for the capital 
intensity:
where Γ1(휇) is the conditional mean of 휂 given 휇 [see Lemma  1(vi)]. In view of 
(20)–(21) wt and rt+1 depend on, respectively, kt and kt+1 so (24) is a non-linear 
implicit function relating kt+1 to kt and the exogenous variables.
2.5  Parameterization and Visualization
In order to visualize the main features of the economy we parameterize the model by 
selecting plausible values for the structural parameters—see Table 1. We follow Hei-
jdra and Reijnders (2012) in the parameterization procedure. First, we postulate plau-
sible values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( 휎 = 0.7 ), the efficiency 
parameter of capital ( 휀 = 0.275 ), the annual capital depreciation rate ( 훿a = 0.06 ), 
the annual growth rate of the population ( na = 0.01 ) and the target annual steady-
state interest rate ( ̂ra = 0.05 ). Using these parameters we can determine the steady-
state (annual) capital-output ratio ( K̂∕Ŷ = 𝜀∕(r̂a + 𝛿a) = 2.5 ). Second, we set the 
length of each period to be 40 years and compute the values for n, 훿 and r̂ (not-
ing that n = (1 + na)40 − 1 , 훿 = 1 − (1 − 훿a)40 and r̂ = (1 + ra)40 − 1 ). Third, we 
assume that the mandatory retirement age is 65 years so that 휆 = 25∕40 = 0.625 . 
In the fourth step, we choose 휂L = 0.5 , 휂H = 1.5 , 휇L = 0.05 , 휇H = 0.95 , so that the 
average health status is ?̄? = 0.5 , average working ability is ?̄? = 1 , and the variances 
are 휎2
휂
= 0.0833 and 휎2
휂
= 0.0675 . By setting 휉 = 4 we ensure that there is a strong 
correlation between health and ability, i.e. cor(휇, 휂) = 0.300.1 In the fifth step we 
































1 The positive correlation between health and income (or productivity) is mentioned by many authors in 
the literature on annuities—see, for example, Walliser (2000), Brunner and Pech (2008), Direr (2010), 
and Cremer et al. (2010). Firm empirical evidence on this correlation is, however, hard to come by. In a 
recent paper Chetty et al. (2016) employ US data for the period 2001–2014 and find that the gap in life 
expectancy between the richest and poorest 1% of individuals was 14.6 years for men and 10.1 years for 
women. In our calibration the expected lifetime at birth of the bottom and top 1% individuals (by produc-
tivity) are 54.65 and 65.35.
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choose Ω0 such that ŷ = 10 in the initial steady state. This also pins down the steady 
state values for k̂ and ŵ . In the final step the discount factor 훽 is used as a calibration 
parameter, i.e. it is set at the value such that the steady-state version of the funda-
mental difference equation (24) is satisfied. To interpret the value of 훽 in Table 1, 
note that the annual rate of time preference is 휌a = 훽−1∕40 − 1 = 0.0204 (a little over 
two percent per annum).
The main features of the steady-state FI equilibrium are reported in column (a) 
of Table 2. Consistent with the calibration procedure, output per efficiency unit of 
labour is equal to ten ( ̂y = 10 ) whilst the steady-state interest rate is five percent 
on an annual basis ( ̂ra = 0.05 ). The steady-state capital intensity equals k̂ = 0.395 . 
Ownership of the capital stock is highly uneven due to the fact that individuals dif-
fer in terms of labour productivity. Indeed, as is noted in the table, the first ability 
quartile of agents (averaged over all survival rates) owns 12.34% of the capital stock. 
In contrast, the top ability quartile owns 39.12% of the economy’s stock of capital.
Steady-state consumption (per efficiency unit of labour) by the young and surviv-























Table 1  Structural parameters
The parameters labelled ‘c’ are calibrated as is explained in the text. 
The remaining parameters are postulated a priori. The values for 훿 
and n follow from, respectively, 훿a and na , by noting that each model 
period represents 40 years
휎 Intertemporal substitution elasticity 0.7000
휀 Capital efficiency parameter 0.2750
훿a Annual capital depreciation rate 0.0600
훿 Capital depreciation factor 0.9158
na Population growth rate 0.0100
n Population growth factor 0.4889
훽 Time preference parameter c 0.4462
휆 Mandatory retirement parameter 0.6250
Ω0 Scale factor production function c 12.9071
휇L Survival rate of the unhealthiest 0.0500
휇H Survival rate of the healthiest 0.9500
휂L Lowest working ability 0.5000
휂H Highest working ability 1.5000
휉 Covariance parameter of the distribu-
tion function
4.0000
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Inequality due to heterogeneous productivity also shows up in the consumption lev-
els during youth and old-age. The two lowest-ability quartiles enjoy a modest and 
declining share of total consumption over the life-cycle due to the positive corre-
lation between health and ability. The opposite holds for the two highest-ability 
quartiles. Finally, Table  2 also reports some welfare indicators. Not surprisingly 
we find that expected lifetime utility is lowest for individuals with low ability and 
Table 2  Allocation and welfare
Here %Qj denotes the share accounted for by skill quartile j (averaged over all survival rates) of the vari-
able directly above it. %SAS is the share owned by the social annuity system. 피Λ̂(𝜇i, 𝜂j) gives expected 
utility for an agent with health type 휇i and skill type 휂i . B̂C is the proportion of the population facing bor-
rowing constraints. ÂS is an indicator for the severity of adverse selection in the private annuity market












휃 = 0.010 휃 = 0.025 휃 = 0.010 휃 = 0.025 휃 = 0.010 휃 = 0.025
ŷ 10.000 9.840 9.776 9.680 9.768 9.668 9.762 9.660
k̂ 0.395 0.373 0.364 0.351 0.363 0.350 0.362 0.349
%Q1 12.34 11.78 10.15 7.73 9.69 6.69 9 .15 5.50
%Q2 19.81 19.46 17.14 13.59 16.90 12.98 16.75 12.60
%Q3 28.73 28.84 25.81 21.05 25.92 21.26 26.12 21.66
%Q4 39.12 39.93 36.18 30.11 36.74 31.46 37.22 32.58
%SAS 10.72 27 .51 10.74 27.60 10.76 27.67
r̂ 6.04 6.34 6.47 6.66 6.48 6.69 6.50 6.70
r̂a 5.00% 5.11% 5.16% 5.22% 5.16% 5.23% 5.17% 5.24%
ŵ 7.250 7.134 7.087 7.018 7.082 7.010 7.077 7.003
B̂C 0.00% 5.83% 10.03% 17.66% 10.63% 19.33% 10.63% 19.33%
̂̄rp 10.18 10.12 9.99 10.12 9.98 10.12 9.96
̂̄𝜇p 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.70
ÂS 1.31 1.34 1.39 1.35 1.40 1.35 1.41
ĉy 5.357 5.296 5.270 5.233 5.268 5.228 5.265 5.225
%Q1 15.99 16.03 16.02 15.98 16.06 16.09 16.12 16.20
%Q2 22.10 22.13 22.12 22.10 22.14 22.16 22.16 22.20
%Q3 28.06 28.05 28.05 28.06 28.04 28.04 28.02 27.99
%Q4 33.85 33.79 33.81 33.86 33.75 33.72 33.70 33.61
ĉo 4.087 4.021 3.994 3.954 3.991 3.949 3.988 3.946
%Q1 12.23 10.70 10.72 10.77 10.77 10.93 10.83 11.14
%Q2 19.74 18.78 18.79 18.82 18.82 18.90 18.83 18.95
%Q3 28.75 29.04 29.03 29.02 29.02 28.98 29.00 28.91
%Q4 39.28 41.48 41.46 41.39 41.39 41.18 41.33 41.00
피Λ̂(𝜇L, 𝜂L) 1.014 0.996 0.989 0.978 1.022 1.020 1.026 1.029
피Λ̂(𝜇H , 𝜂L) 1.433 1.471 1.468 1.463 1.260 1.261 1.266 1.276
피Λ̂(𝜇L, 𝜂H) 1.529 1.517 1.513 1.506 1.532 1.527 1.531 1.525
피Λ̂(𝜇H , 𝜂H) 2.143 2.167 2.164 2.161 2.031 2.026 2.030 2.024
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poor health ( 휇L, 휂L ) and highest for those lucky ones with high ability and excellent 
health ( 휇H , 휂H).2
In Fig. 3 we depict the steady-state profiles for youth consumption, old-age con-
sumption, annuity demand, and expected utility. These profiles have been averaged 
over 휂 values and are thus a function of the survival probability only:
noitpmusnocega-dlO(b)noitpmusnochtuoY(a)
Cˆy(µ) Cˆo(µ)



















































Fig. 3  Steady-state profiles. The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles for the full information (FI) 
case featuring perfect annuities. The dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asymmetric information 
(AI) case in which adverse selection results in a single pooling rate of interest on annuities, r̄p
t+1
 . In the 
AI case agents with poor health face binding borrowing constraints regardless of their productivity in the 
labour market
2 By scaling steady-state output such that ŷ = 10 for the FI case we avoid the counterintuitive feature 
noted by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, p. 321) that lifetime utility is decreasing in the survival probabil-
ity.
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In panel (a) we find that Ĉy(𝜇) is increasing in 휇 . This result is the opposite of the 
findings reported by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, p. 321) who assume that all indi-
viduals have the same labour productivity (i.e., 휎2
휂
= 0 in their model). In our model, 
for a given productivity level 휂 , youth consumption is decreasing in the survival 
probability (see Fig. 2). But as a result of the positive correlation between 휂 and 휇 , 
healthy agents also tend to be wealthy agents who consume more in youth as a 










 is decreasing in 휇 
but the Γ1(휇) term is increasing in 휇 [see Lemma 1(vi)]. Due to the strong correla-
tion between 휇 and 휂 the latter effect dominates the former, thus ensuring that Ĉy(𝜇) 
is increasing in the survival probability.
As panel (b) shows, the profile for old-age consumption Ĉo(𝜇) is also increasing 
in 휇 . Again this result is reversed if all agents feature the same labour productivity, 
as can be easily verified with the aid of Fig. 2. In panel (c) we find that Âp(𝜇) is 
increasing in 휇 . This result even holds if 휎2
휂











 is increasing in 휇 . Finally, as panel (d) illustrates, 피Λ̂(𝜇) is 
increasing in the survival probability. Intuitively, for a given productivity level 휂 
individual lifetime utility is increasing in 휇 (people like surviving into old-age). Fur-
thermore, 휇 and 휂 are positively correlated thus strengthening the positive link 
between utility and health.
3  Informational Asymmetry in the Private Annuity Market
In the previous section we have studied the steady state of an economy populated by 
heterogeneous individuals facing longevity risk and differing in terms of their innate 
labour productivity. With full information about the health status of individuals, 
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insurance products at a price that is actuarially fair for all individuals. In this sec-
tion we study the less pristine—and arguably much more realistic—scenario under 
which information regarding a person’s health is not perfectly observable by insur-
ance firms. Indeed, from here on we drop Assumption (A0) and replace it by the fol-
lowing alternative assumptions:
 (A3) Health status and productivity are private information of the annuitant. The 
distribution of health and productivity types in the population, H(휇, 휂) , is com-
mon knowledge.
 (A4) Annuitants can buy multiple annuities for different amounts and from differ-
ent annuity firms. Individual annuity firms cannot monitor their clients’ wage 
income or annuity holdings with other firms.
As is explained by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, pp. 325–326), in this Asymmetric 
Information case (abbreviated as AI) the market for private annuities is character-
ized by a pooling equilibrium. In this equilibrium there is a single pooled annuity 
rate, r̄p
t+1
 , which applies to all purchasers of private annuities. Lacking information 
about an individual’s health and productivity, the annuity company cannot obtain 
full information revelation by setting both price and quantity. As a result, Pauly’s 
(1974) linear pricing concept is the relevant one.3 A second feature of the pooling 
equilibrium is that there typically are unhealthy agents who drop out of the annuity 
market altogether and face binding borrowing constraints. Indeed, since an individu-
al’s human wealth is proportional to his/her labour productivity, and individual con-
sumption is decreasing in the survival rate, there may exist a cut-off survival prob-
ability, 휇bc
t
 , below which individuals would like to go short on annuities. But this is 
impossible because in doing so they would reveal their poor health status and obtain 
an offer they cannot possibly accept from annuity firms (more on this below).4
The pooled annuity rate, r̄p
t+1
 , is determined as follows. We assume that the cut-off 
health type is 휇bc
t
 such that consumers with health type 𝜇L ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇bct  purchase no 
annuities. Net savers feature a survival probability such that 휇bc
t
≤ 휇 ≤ 휇H and pur-
chase annuities. The zero-profit condition for the private annuity market is given by:
where 1 + rt+1 is the gross rate of return on physical capital, 1 + r̄pt+1 is the gross 
rate of return on private annuities, Lt(휇, 휂) is the density of type (휇, 휂) consumers 






















3 See also Abel (1986), Walliser (2000), Palmon and Spivak (2007) and Sheshinski (2008) on linear 
pricing of annuities.
4 Villeneuve formulates a partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous survival rates (and identical 
labour productivity). He argues that only one insurance market can be active at any time, i.e. either the 
annuity market or the life-insurance market is active but not both. If there is no demand for life insurance 
in the full information case—as is the case in our model of the closed economy—then adverse selection 
in the market for private annuities cannot result in the activation of the life insurance market (2003, p. 
534).
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agents. The gross returns from the annuity savings of all annuitants in period t (left-
hand side of (31)) are redistributed to the surviving annuitants in the form of insur-
ance claims in period t + 1 (right-hand side of (31)). It follows that the pooling rate 
equals:
where ?̄?pt  denotes the asset-weighted average survival rate of annuity purchasers:




t < 𝜇H < 1 , 
it follows from (32) that r̄p
t+1
 exceeds rt+1 so that all net savers will completely annu-
itize their wealth. Hence, Yaari’s (1965) classic result also holds in the pooled annuity 
market.
The pooling rate (32) is demographically unfair because it is based on the 
asset-weighted survival rate ?̄?pt  rather than on the average survival rate in the 
population ?̄? . The demographically fair pooling rate is given by:
and, since ?̄? < ?̄?pt  (see Supplementary Material, Appendix B), it follows readily 





 . In our numerical exercise we 
follow Walliser (2000,  p. 380) by constructing an adverse selection index ASt (or 
‘load factor’) which shows by how much the asking price of an annuity insurance 
company exceeds the demographically fair price:
As a result of adverse selection in the private annuity market, ASt exceeds unity. 
Furthermore, the larger is ASt , the more severe is the adverse selection problem.
Under the maintained assumption that 𝜇L < 𝜇bct < 𝜇H , there are two types of 
agents in the economy. Individuals with a relatively low survival probability 
( 𝜇L ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇bct  ) will face a binding borrowing constraint, whilst healthier indi-
viduals ( 휇bc
t
≤ 휇 ≤ 휇H ) will be net savers. It follows that constrained individuals 
simply consume their endowment incomes in the two periods:
For unconstrained individuals the consolidated budget constraint in a pooled annuity 
market is given by:





















t (𝜇, 𝜂)h(𝜇, 𝜂)d𝜇d𝜂
.


















(36)Cyt (휇, 휂) = wt(휂),
(37)Cot+1(휇, 휂) = 휆wt+1(휂).
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where r̄p
t+1
 is the pooling rate of interest. Such consumers choose Cyt (휇, 휂) and 
Co
t+1
(휇, 휂) in order to maximize expected lifetime utility (2) subject to the budget 
constraint (38). The optimal consumption plans and annuity demand are fully char-
acterized by:
where we have used the expression for the pooled annuity rate as given in (32).
The optimal consumption choices of different types of consumers are illus-
trated in Fig. 4. Just as for the FI case we only illustrate the choices made by the 
four extreme types, unhealthy and healthy lowest-skilled (휇L, 휂L) and (휇H , 휂L) , 
and unhealthy and healthy highest-skilled (휇L, 휂H) and (휇H , 휂H) . In view of (38) 












































































Fig. 4  Consumption-saving choices under asymmetric information. LBC(휂j) is the lifetime budget con-
straint for an individual with productivity 휂j . IEL is the income endowment line and agents are located on 
the line segment ELEH . MRSC(휇i ) is the consumption Euler equation for an individual with survival rate 
휇i facing a pooled annuity rate of interest r̄
p
t+1
 . For individuals with 휇bc
t
≤ 휇 ≤ 휇H optimal consumption 
is located at the intersection of MRSC(휇i ) and LBC(휂j ). All other individuals face borrowing constraints 
and consume along ELEH
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the location of an individual’s lifetime budget constraint only depends on the per-
son’s productivity level, so that LBC(휂L) and LBC(휂H) are parallel. As before the 
income endowment line is given by IEL, so that the two relevant endowment points 
are given by, respectively, points EL and EH . The consumption Euler equation for 
unconstrained consumers operating in a pooled annuity market is given by:
where we have used (32) to get from the first to the second equality. Using the 
CRRA felicity function stated in (3), we easily find that the Euler equation is a 
straight line from the origin with a slope that depends positively on 휇 . In Fig. 4 we 
have drawn the Euler equations as MRSC(휇H) and MRSC(휇L) . Since MRSC(휇H) 
lies to the left of IEL, points B and D denote the optimal (unconstrained) consump-
tion points for, respectively, the lowest-skilled and highest-skilled consumers. In 
contrast, since MRSC(휇L) lies to the right of IEL, points A and C are infeasible as 
they would involve going short on annuities. It follows that all lowest-health individ-
uals face borrowing constraints. Furthermore, the Euler equation (42) that coincides 
with the IEL, MRSC(휇bc
t
) , determines the cut-off health type 휇bc
t
:
Unconstrained consumers are located in the area ELBDEH whilst constrained indi-
viduals are bunched on the line segment ELEH . It is worth noting that 휇bct  depends 
on the current and future capital intensity in the economy via factor prices. Given 
the specification of preferences and technology, however, 휇bc
t
 does not depend on 휂 
itself.
In the presence of binding borrowing constraints, the capital accumulation iden-
tity (23) is augmented to:
By substituting the demand for annuities (41) into (44 ) we obtain the fundamental 
difference equation for the capital intensity:
where Γ1(휇) is the conditional mean of 휂 [defined in Lemma 1(vi) above], and the 
factor prices follow from (20)–(21).
The main features of the steady-state AI equilibrium are reported in col-
umn (b) of Table 2. As a result of asymmetric information in the annuity mar-
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the steady-state capital intensity falls by 5.71% ( ̂k = 0.373 ). The decrease in 
the capital intensity causes the annual interest rate to rise by 12 basis points 
( ̂ra = 5.11% ) and the wage rate to fall by 1.60%. So despite the fact that only 
5.83% of young individuals face binding borrowing constraints (see B̂C ), the 
macroeconomic effects of information asymmetry are far from trivial in size. 
The adverse selection index, as defined in (35) above, equals ÂS = 1.31 and the 
asset-weighted average survival rate of annuitants equals ̂̄𝜇p = 0.66 . Finally, as 
the welfare indicators at the bottom of Table 2 reveal, under asymmetric infor-
mation unhealthy individuals are worse off while their healthy cohort members 
are better off than under the FI case. The information asymmetry redistributes 
resources from unhealthy to healthy agents.
In Fig. 3 we depict with dashed lines the steady-state profiles for youth con-
sumption, old-age consumption, annuity demand, and expected utility. Just as 
for the FI case these profiles have been averaged over 휂:
where 핀AI(휇) = 0 for 𝜇L ≤ 𝜇 < ?̂?bc and 핀AI(휇) = 1 for ?̂?bc ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝜇H . In panel (a) we 
find that youth consumption Ĉy(𝜇) is increasing in 휇 . Interestingly, for 휇 close to 
?̂?bc youth consumption is higher under AI than for the FI case. Young individuals 
facing borrowing constraints are unable to smooth consumption in the AI case and 
just consume their endowment income. Net savers featuring a survival probability 
close to ?̂?bc purchase virtually no annuities at all as the pooling rate is unattractive to 
them—see panel (c). For higher levels of 휇 annuity demands are higher and saving 
for old-age increases. In panel (b) we show that the healthiest agents consume more 
during old-age under AI compared to FI. In panel (d) we find that the healthiest indi-
viduals are actually better off under AI than under FI. The information asymmetry 
benefits such individuals.
4  Public Annuities to the Rescue?
In the adverse selection economy studied in the previous section relatively unhealthy 
annuitants face a disadvantageous pooling rate of interest on their annuities. In 
essence such individuals are subsidizing their healthy cohort members through the 
annuity market. Following Abel (1987) we now extend our model by introducing a 
(46)Ĉy(𝜇) =
[
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fully-funded mandatory social security system that is run by the government.5 Such 
a system is immune to adverse selection because all individuals are forced to partici-
pate in it—the government possesses the power to tax. In particular, every individual 
pays a social security tax 휃 (such that 0 < 𝜃 < 1 ) and receives a retirement pension 
upon surviving into old-age. We assume that the pension contribution is propor-
tional to wage income. Like the private sector, the government cannot observe an 
individual’s health status though it can measure a person’s income. It follows that 
the pension contribution can be written as As
t
(휂) = 휃wt(휂) . Total pension contribu-
tions amount to As
t
= 𝜃?̄?wtLt and are invested in the capital market earning a gross 
rate of return equal to 1 + rt+1 . In the next period the returns Rt+1 = (1 + rt+1)Ast are 
paid out to surviving agents. Under this funded pension system redistribution takes 
place between agents of the same birth cohort (from those who die to survivors). 
Hence, social security plays the role of public annuities. In this section we consider 
three prototypical types of pension systems. The difference lies in the method in 
which the returns are distributed to surviving individuals.
• Pension system A pension receipts during old-age are proportional to contribu-
tions made during youth.
• Pension system B pension contributions of 휂 types are distributed during old-age 
to surviving 휂 types.
• Pension system C pension receipts are the same in absolute value for all surviv-
ing agents.
4.1  Pension System A
Under system A pension receipts are given by:
where 휁 is a parameter to be determined below. The clearing condition for the public 
annuity system is given in this case by:
The left-hand side of this expression is the total amount to be distributed to survi-
vors and the right-hand side represents total pension payments. By substituting (49) 
into (50) and noting that wt(휂) = 휂wt and Lt(휇, 휂) = Lth(휇, 휂) we find the balanced-
budget solution for 휁:
(49)Rst+1(휂) = 휁휃wt(휂),












, 𝜁A ≡ ?̄??̄?
cov(𝜂,𝜇) + ?̄??̄?
,
5 There is one important difference in that Abel (1987) restricts attention to the full information (FI) case 
in which perfect private annuities are available. In order not to unduly interrupt the flow of the paper, we 
present the FI results for our model in the Supplementary Material (Appendix C).
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where ?̄? is the average survival rate of the population and 휁A is a constant (featuring 
0 < 𝜁A < 1 because cov(휂,휇) is positive). It follows from (51) that under pension 
system A the rate of return on social annuities falls short of the demographically 
fair social annuity yield, (1 + rt+1)∕?̄? , because health and productivity are positively 
correlated. Intuitively, the high contributors (featuring a high 휂 ) tend to live longer 
than average.
Just as in the adverse selection economy studied in the previous section individuals 
can buy private annuities in the pooled annuity market but some agents will face bor-
rowing constraint. Constrained individuals simply consume their endowment incomes 
in the two periods:
For unconstrained individuals the consolidated budget constraint in the presence of 
a pooled annuity market is given by:
where r̄p
t+1
 is the pooling rate of interest. The pension system reduces current wage 
income but increases future income. Consumers choose Cyt (휇, 휂) and Cot+1(휇, 휂) in 
order to maximize expected lifetime utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (54). 
The optimal consumption plans and annuity demands are fully characterized by:
where we have used the expression for the pooled annuity rate as given in (32). 
The social annuity system affects an individual’s human wealth at birth [the term 
in square brackets on the right-hand side of (55)] but it is not a priori clear in which 
direction. Indeed, the effective pension contribution rate is:
(52)Cyt (휇, 휂) = (1 − 휃)wt(휂),
(53)Cot+1(휇, 휂) = 휆wt+1(휂) + Rst+1(휂).
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On the one hand, with a positive correlation between health and ability 휁A is such 
that 0 < 𝜁A < 1 . On the other hand, the survival rate of private annuitants exceeds 
the population-wide average survival rate, i.e. ?̄?pt ∕?̄? > 1 . It thus follows that 휃nt  is 
ambiguous in sign. In this paper we focus on the case for which 휃n
t
 is negative so 
that, ceteris paribus factor prices and the pooled survival rate, human wealth is 
increased as a result of the public pension system.6
The optimal consumption choices can be explained with the aid of Fig.  5. To 
facilitate the comparison with the AI case we keep factor prices and the pooled 
survival rate at the levels for that case. Hence the diagram shows the partial equi-
librium effects on individual choices of the introduction of a pension system. The 
dashed lines correspond to the AI case. As a result of the public pension system the 
lifetime budget constraints shift outward (because 𝜃n
t
< 0 ), more so the higher is 휂 . 
The income endowment line rotates in a counter-clockwise fashion. Unconstrained 
individuals increase consumption during youth and old-age. In contrast, constrained 










Fig. 5  Consumption-saving choices under pension system A. LBC(휂j) is the lifetime budget constraint 
for an individual with productivity 휂j . IEL is the income endowment line and agents are located on the 
line segment ELEH . MRSC(휇i ) is the consumption Euler equation for an individual with survival rate 휇i 
facing a pooled annuity rate of interest r̄p
t+1
 . For individuals with 휇bc
t
≤ 휇 ≤ 휇H optimal consumption is 
located at the intersection of MRSC(휇i ) and LBC(휂j ). All other individuals face borrowing constraints 
and consume along ELEH . The dashed lines visualize the corresponding schedules for the AI case. Factor 
prices are held the same for SA and AI to facilitate the comparison
6 In the numerical simulations 휁A = 0.9569 and ?̄? = 0.5 . Hence the effective pension contribution is neg-
ative for any ?̄?pt  exceeding ?̄?∕𝜁A = 0.5225 . This condition is easily satisfied. See also Fig. 9c for an illus-
tration of effective contribution rates under the different pension systems.
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the line segment ELEH . Just as for the AI case there is a single cut-off value for the 
survival probability below which agents are facing borrowing constraints:
Because wages and pension receipts are proportional to 휂 and the felicity function is 
homothetic, it follows from (59) that 휇bc
t
 does not depend on 휂 . As is clear from the 
diagram, the introduction of public pensions will increase the population fraction of 
people facing borrowing constraints.
In order to glean the general equilibrium effects of introducing a public pension 
system we must formulate the capital accumulation identity. Since public and pri-
vate annuities are invested in the capital markets, the accumulation equation takes 
the following format:
By substituting the demand for annuities (57) into (60 ) we obtain the fundamental 
difference equation for the capital intensity:
where Γ1(휇) is the conditional mean of 휂 [defined in Lemma 1(vi) above], and the 
factor prices follow from (20)–(21).
The main features of the steady-state equilibrium with pension system A (labeled 
SA) are reported in columns (c)–(d) of Table 2. In column (c) the contribution rate 
equals 휃 = 0.010 which means that the system is relatively small as the income 
replacement rate during retirement, 𝜉SA ≡ 𝜃𝜁A(1 + r̂)∕[(1 − 𝜆)?̄?] , is only about 
0.3812. In column (d) the contribution rate equals 휃 = 0.025 which results in a large 
pension system, i.e. 휉SA = 0.9776 . Comparing columns (b) and (d) we find that out-
put per efficiency unit of labour drops by 1.62% ( ̂y = 9.680 ) whilst the steady-state 
capital intensity falls by 5.76% ( ̂k = 0.351 ). As a result of the decrease in the cap-
ital intensity, the annual interest rate rises by 11 basis points ( ̂ra = 5.22% ) whilst 
the wage rate falls by 1.6%. The proportion of constrained individual rises from 
5.83 to 17.66%. The adverse selection index, as defined in (35) above, increases 
to ÂS = 1.39 and the asset-weighted average survival rate of annuitants rises to 
̂̄𝜇p = 0.70 . Despite the fact that the rate of return on capital increases, the return on 
private annuities decreases slightly because the pooled survival rate ̂̄𝜇p increases by 
more. Finally, as the welfare indicators at the bottom of Table 2 reveal, under pen-
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system crowds out capital and exacerbates the adverse selection problem in the mar-
ket for private annuities.
In Fig. 6 we use solid lines to depict the profiles for youth and old-age consump-


































































Fig. 6  Steady-state profiles under pension system A. The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles under 
pension system A (SA), and the dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asymmetric information (AI) 
case without pensions. In both cases adverse selection results in a single pooling rate of interest on annu-
ities, r̄p
t+1
 , and agents with poor health face binding borrowing constraints. The SA case has been drawn 
for a large system featuring 휃 = 0.025
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where 핀SA(휇) = 0 for 𝜇L ≤ 𝜇 < ?̂?bc and 핀AI(휇) = 1 for ?̂?bc ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝜇H . The dashed 
lines in Fig. 6 correspond to the profiles for the AI case. Youth consumption, annu-
ity demand, and lifetime utility are all lower under SA than under AI. Old-age con-
sumption is higher under AI for most borrowing constrained individuals.
4.2  Pension System B
Under pension system B the government uses information on a person’s wage 
income to deduce that individual’s innate ability. It uses its knowledge of 휂 by set-
ting pension receipts according to the following rule:
where 휁(휂) is a function to be determined below. For each ability level 휂 , the budget 
constraint for the public pension system is given by:
The left-hand side of this expression is the total amount to be distributed to type 휂 
survivors whilst the right-hand side represents total pension payments to such indi-
viduals. Under this system public annuities are such that longevity risk is shared 
among individuals of the same productivity type. By substituting (65) into (66) and 
noting that wt(휂) = 휂wt and Lt(휇, 휂) = Lth(휇, 휂) we find the balanced-budget solu-
tion for 휁(휂):
For relatively productive individuals (featuring 𝜂 > ?̄? ) the rate of return on social 
annuities falls short of the actuarially fair social annuity yield, (1 + rt+1)∕?̄? , because 
such people tend to have a relatively high survival rate. In contrast, for relatively 
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than the actuarially fair social annuity yield because such people tend to have a rela-
tively low survival rate.
Individuals facing a binding borrowing constraint consume according to (52), 
(53) with Rs
t+1
(휂) as stated in (65) and (67). For unconstrained individuals the 
optimal consumption plans and annuity demands are fully characterized by:




















































































Fig. 7  Consumption-saving choices under pension system B. LBC(휂j) is the lifetime budget constraint 
for an individual with productivity 휂j . IEL is the income endowment line and agents are located on the 
line segment ELEH . MRSC(휇i ) is the consumption Euler equation for an individual with survival rate 
휇i facing a pooled annuity rate of interest r̄
p
t+1
 . The dashed and dotted lines visualize the corresponding 
schedules for the AI and SA cases respectively. Factor prices are held the same for SB and AI to facili-
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where we have substituted wt(휂) = 휂wt and used the expression for the pooled annu-
ity rate as given in (32).
The optimal consumption choices can be explained with the aid of Fig. 7. Just as 
before we focus on the four extreme types. The solid lines depict the situation under 
pension system B. For purposes of reference the dashed lines in the diagram represent 
the AI case (without pensions) whilst the thin dotted lines represent the SA case. We 
keep factor prices constant at their AI levels. Under pension system B the IEL pivots 
around some point C on the old IEL line for the SA case. Intuitively this is because sys-
tem B incorporates explicit redistribution from high-ability to low-ability individuals 
and, as a result of the positive correlation between ability and health, implicit redistri-
bution from healthy to unhealthy individuals. With asymmetric information in the pri-
vate annuity market the pooling equilibrium causes a redistribution of resources from 
unhealthy to healthy individuals, i.e. from people who tend to be poor to individuals 
who tend to be rich. Pension system A does nothing to redress this phenomenon. In 
contrast, under system B the high-skilled get a lower return on social annuities than the 
low-skilled do, so there is some redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals via 
that channel.
As is marked in the diagram, lowest-ability types experience borrowing constraint 
for 𝜇 < 𝜇bc
t
(𝜂L) whilst highest-ability individuals experience such constraints for 
𝜇 < 𝜇bc
t
(𝜂H) , where 𝜇bct (𝜂H) < 𝜇bct (𝜂L) . Mathematically, an individual with produc-































Fig. 8  Ability and borrowing constraints. Under pension systems B and C the critical level of the sur-
vival rate below which borrowing constraints become active, 휇bc
t
(휂) , depends negatively on the individu-
al’s productivity 휂 . In Fig. 7 the income endowment points no longer lie along a ray from the origin
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Despite the fact that the felicity function is homothetic and wages are proportional to 
휂 , 휇bc
t
 depends on 휂 because productivity features nonlinearly in 휁B(휂).
In Fig. 8 we illustrate the relationship between ability 휂 and the critical survival 
rate 휇bc
t
(휂) . The thin solid line represents the AI case for which ?̂?bc = 0.1028 and 
5.83% of agents are constrained. The dashed line depicts the situation for the SA 
case (with 휃 = 0.025 ) for which ?̂?bc = 0.2090 and 17.66% of agents are constrained. 
Finally, the thick solid line in Fig. 8 illustrates the SB case. As is predicted by the 
theory there is a downward sloping relationship between 휂 and ?̂?bc . For the lowest-
ability types the cut-off value equals 0.2590 whereas it is equal to 0.1902 for the 
highest-ability individuals. So by engaging in redistribution from high-ability to 
low-ability individuals the policy maker worsens the incidence of borrowing con-
straints to the latter types.
tpiecernoisneP(b)erahsetar-riaF(a)
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Fig. 9  Comparing pension systems. The fair-rate share 휁i(휂) measures the individual’s gross yield on 
social annuities under pension system i expressed as a share of the actuarially fair yield, (1 + r̄p
t+1
)∕?̄? . 
A negative value for the effective pension contribution rate 휃n
t
(휂) implies that the pension system makes 
individuals wealthier in a partial equilibrium sense
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In Fig. 9 we compare some features of pension systems A and B. Panel (a) depicts 
the fair-rates shares 휁A (a constant) and 휁B(휂) (downward sloping because of redis-
tribution). Panel (b) shows that pensions receipts are increasing in ability for both 
systems. In panel (c) we depict the effective pension contribution rate 휃n
t
(휂) . Under 
system A this is a negative constant, but under system B the effective rate is increas-
ing in ability:
For our parameterization 휃n
t
(휂) remains negative for all ability levels, although barely 
so for the highest-ability types.
Under pension system B the capital accumulation identity is given by:
where 휇bc
t
(휂) is determined in (71) and is illustrated in Fig. 8. By substituting the 
demand for annuities (70) into (73) we obtain the fundamental difference equation 
for the capital intensity:
The main features of the steady-state equilibrium with a small and large pension 
system B (labeled SB) are reported in, respectively, columns (e) and (f) of Table 2. 
We focus attention at the large pension system featuring 휃 = 0.025 . Comparing col-
umns (b) and (f) we find that output per efficiency unit of labour drops by 1.74% 
( ̂y = 9.668 ) whilst the steady-state capital intensity falls by 6.19% ( ̂k = 0.350 ). As 
a result of the decrease in the capital intensity, the annual interest rate rises by 12 
basis points ( ̂ra = 5.23% ) whilst the wage rate falls by 1.74%. The proportion of 
constrained individual rises from 5.83% to 19.33%. The adverse selection index, as 
defined in (35) above, increases to ÂS = 1.40 , the asset-weighted average survival 
rate of annuitants rises to ̂̄𝜇p = 0.70 , and the return on private annuities decreases 
slightly to ̂̄rp = 9.98 . Finally, as the welfare indicators at the bottom of Table  2 
reveal, under pension system B poor-health individuals are better off compared to 
the AI case as a result of the redistributionary feature of system B. The opposite 
holds for the healthy agents. Even though the policy maker cannot observe an indi-
vidual’s health status, by including a redistributionary component in the public pen-
sion system, the unhealthiest in society are aided somewhat.
In Fig. 10 we present the 휂-averaged profiles for consumption during youth and 
old-age, annuity demand, and lifetime utility. These profiles are defined as:


























































































































































Fig. 10  Steady-state profiles under pension system B. The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles 
under pension system B (SB), and the dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asymmetric information 
(AI) case without pensions. In both cases adverse selection results in a single pooling rate of interest on 
annuities, r̄p
t+1
 , and agents with poor health face binding borrowing constraints. The SB case has been 
drawn for a large system featuring 휃 = 0.025
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where 핀SB(휇, 휂) = 0 if Âp(𝜇, 𝜂) < 0 and 핀SB(휇, 휂) = 1 if Âp(𝜇, 𝜂) ≥ 0.7 The profiles for 
SB and SA (in Fig. 6) are very similar.
4.3  Pension System C
The final case we consider is pension system C under which the government engages 
in more extreme redistribution from the rich to the poor (than under system B) by 
providing every surviving individual with the same pension payment:
where R̄s
t+1
 is to be determined below. The clearing condition for the public pension 
system is given in this case by:
so that R̄s
t+1















































































































7 Using Fig.  7 the indicator function 핀SB(휇, 휂) can be characterized a bit further. For 𝜇L ≤ 𝜇 < ?̂?bc(𝜂H) 
all individuals are constrained, i.e. 핀SB(휇, 휂) = 0 for all 휂 ∈ [휂L, 휂H] . Similarly, for ?̂?bc(𝜂L) ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇H all 
individuals are unconstrained, i.e. 핀SB(휇, 휂) = 1 for all 휂 ∈ [휂L, 휂H] . Finally, for ?̂?bc(𝜂H) ≤ 𝜇 ≤ ?̂?bc(𝜂L) we 
define the critical level of 휂 at which borrowing constraints cease to bind, i.e. ?̂?bc(𝜇) is the inverse function 
of ?̂?bc(𝜂) in that domain. Then 핀SB(휇, 휂) = 0 for 𝜂L ≤ 𝜂 < ?̂?bc(𝜇) and 핀SB(휇, 휂) = 1 for ?̂?bc(𝜇) ≤ 𝜂 ≤ 𝜂H .
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Expressing the pension receipt in terms of the contribution made during youth we 
find for a person of type 휂 that Rs
t+1
(휂) = 휁(휂)휃wt(휂) where 휁(휂) is given by:
See Fig. 9 for features of pension system C. It follows from (81) that for individuals 
with above-average productivity, 𝜂 > ?̄? , the rate of return on social annuities falls 
short of the actuarially fair social annuity yield, (1 + rt+1)∕?̄? . In contrast, below-
average individuals get a better-than actuarially fair rate on the pension contribu-
tions. Intuitively these results follow from the fact that the pension system redistrib-
utes resources from productive to less productive agents.
Qualitatively system C is very similar to system B (in that both feature redistribu-
tion for healthy to unhealthy agents) and the key expressions characterizing system C 
can be obtained by replacing 휁B(휂) with 휁C(휂) in Eqs. (68)–(77). The main features of 
system C are the following. First, the comparison of columns (b) and (g) in Table 2 
reveals that output and wages fall by 1.83% ( ̂y = 9.660 ) and the capital intensity 
drops by 6.49% ( ̂k = 0.349 ). Out of the three pension systems considered, system 
C features the largest macroeconomic effects. Redistribution is macroeconomically 
costly. Second, from Fig. 9 it is clear that pension system C indeed features the high-
est degree of redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals. Indeed, as can be 
observed in panel (c) the effective contribution rate 휃n
t
(휂) becomes positive for the 
most healthy individuals. Such individuals experience the pension system as a tax 
burden. Third, as is shown in Fig. 8 low-ability types are affected most severely by 
borrowing constraints under pension system C. Finally, the individual 휂-averaged 
profiles for consumption, annuity demands, and utility are depicted in Fig. 11. These 
profiles are very similar to the ones we found for system B.
5  Privatizing Social Security
The key message of the previous section is loud and clear. The mandatory funded 
pension systems that we have studied are immune to adverse selection by design but 
they exacerbate the adverse selection problem in the market for private annuities, 
increase the fraction of borrowing-constrained (‘over-annuitized’) individuals in 
the population, and lead to long-run crowding out of capital and substantial output 
losses. This begs the following question: is it better to privatize social security alto-
gether and to allow individuals to insure against longevity risk in the private annu-
ity market even though this market is not perfect? Referring to Table 2 we find that 
abolishing the large pension system A (featuring 휃 = 0.025 ) would increase output 
by 1.65% in the long run. In addition, it would increase steady-state welfare of all 
corner types in the economy, cf. the information contained in columns (d) and (b). 
At least in the long run, privatization is a ‘win-win’ scenario.
Of course, comparing steady states gives only part of the answer. What mat-
ters is whether or not is possible to abolish the funded pension system in a Pareto 




, 𝜁C(𝜂) ≡ ?̄?𝜂 .
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question we now study the transitional dynamic effects of abolishing pension system 
A. The economy is in the steady state for the SA system with 휃 = 0.025 and the 
capital intensity is equal to k̂SA = 0.351 . At shock-time t = 0 , the pension system is 
abolished so that young individuals do not pay the pension contribution anymore, 
i.e. wage income from t = 0 onward equals wt(휂) and pensions receipts from period 
t = 1 onward are equal to zero, Rs
t
(휂) = 0 . Of course the old survivors at the time of 
the shock receive the pension they saved for, i.e. Rs
0
(𝜂) > 0.
Figure  12 depicts some of the key features of the transition process. Panel (a) 
shows that the capital intensity is predetermined at impact but thereafter rises mono-
tonically to settle at the new steady-state level associated with the AI equilibrium, 
k̂AI = 0.373 . Panel (b) show the percentage change in youth-consumption for healthy 
noitpmusnocega-dlO(b)noitpmusnochtuoY(a)
Cˆy(µ) Cˆo(µ)











































Fig. 11  Steady-state profiles under pension system C. The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles 
under pension system C (SC), and the dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asymmetric information 
(AI) case without pensions. In both cases adverse selection results in a single pooling rate of interest on 
annuities, r̄p
t+1
 , and agents with poor health face binding borrowing constraints. The SC case has been 
drawn for a large system featuring 휃 = 0.025
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and unhealthy individuals with the lowest skill level. Interestingly, the healthy indi-
viduals decrease their consumption whilst the unhealthy increase it. The response 
of the latter group of people is easy to understand: these individuals were facing 
severe borrowing constraints in the SA system (and will continue to do so to a lesser 
degree in the AI equilibrium). Because the pension system is abolished (and 휃 = 0 ) 
they can increase their consumption during youth and reduce the degree of overan-
nuitization. Note that in panel (c) the overannuitization faced by the unhealthy is 





















































Fig. 12  Abolishing pension system A. At time t = 0 pension system A with a contribution rate of 
휃 = 0.025 is abolished permanently. The system is initially in the steady state featuring a capital inten-
sity k̂SA = 0.351 . a Over time the economy converges monotonically to the steady-state for the AI case 
with k̂AI = 0.373 . b, c Show the percentage change in, respectively, youth and old-age consumption for 
an individual of type (휇i, 휂L) . d Depicts the percentage change in annuity demand of a person of type 
(휇H , 휂L) . See also Table 2
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surviving shock-time young are old) and beyond. Finally, in panel (d) we show that 
there is a strong increase in the demand for private annuities by the healthy agents.8 
There is virtually no transitional dynamics in 휇bc
t
 which falls from ?̂?bc = 0.2090 to 
휇bc
0
= 0.1026 and thereafter settles at ?̂?bc = 0.1025 . It follows that all agents featur-
ing 𝜇 < 0.1025 face borrowing constraints during youth no matter when they are 
born.
(a)Unhealthy and low productivity (b)Unhealthy and high productivity
EΛt(µL, ηL) EΛt(µL, ηH)




















(c)Healthy and low productivity (d)Healthy and high productivity
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Fig. 13  Lifetime utility of corner types. The solid lines depict the steady-state lifetime utility levels 
attained by the different corner types under pension system A (SA) with 휃 = 0.025 . The abolishment of 
the pension system occurs at time t = 0 and affects lifetime utility of different types over time. Unhealthy 
agents benefit from the policy initiative no matter when they are born. Healthy individuals born at the 
time of the shock are worse off as a result of it
8 Since youth-consumption, private annuity demand, and old-age consumption are linear in 휂 for both 
SA and AI systems, it follows that the information in panels (b)–(d) is the same for all values of 휂.
212 B. J. Heijdra et al.
1 3
In Fig. 13 we illustrate the effects on lifetime welfare for the four corner types in 
the economy, i.e. (휇L, 휂L) , (휇L, 휂H) , (휇H , 휂L) , and (휇H , 휂H) . Regardless of when they 
are born and irrespective of their productivity level, the unhealthiest individuals are 
better off as a result of the pension abolishment. Expected lifetime utility rises over 
time so for all corner types the gain is higher the later they are born. Interestingly, 
healthy agents born at the time of the shock are worse off than they would have been 
under the SA system. Privatizing social security is not a ‘win-win’ scenario to all 
generations.
6  Conclusion
In our paper we have developed an overlapping generations model which features 
adverse selection in the private annuity market and endogenously determined bor-
rowing constraints in the capital market. Consumers are assumed to be heterogene-
ous in two dimensions—working ability and health status—which in the absence 
of perfect information leads to adverse selection in the private annuity market. Fur-
thermore, they are restricted from borrowing against their anticipated future wage 
income due to the borrowing constraints. We demonstrate numerically that the 
informational asymmetry matters quantitatively in that, compared to the world with 
perfect information, it causes first-order reductions in output per efficiency unit of 
labour and the capital intensity. Starting from the benchmark model with adverse 
selection we introduce a fully-funded social security system and study its impact 
on capital accumulation and individual welfare under three different pension benefit 
rules.
We find that the social security system affects both capital accumulation and 
the proportion of individuals that are facing borrowing constraints. Capital crowd-
ing out increases and borrowing constraints become more prevalent the larger is the 
pension system. Intuitively a social security system causes more consumers to be 
over-annuitized and to face borrowing constraints. They cannot undo the effects of 
social security by transacting in their private accounts because any attempt to go 
short on annuities (demanding life-insured loans) would reveal their health status to 
the insurance companies in a world with asymmetric information.
The welfare effects of social security depend both on the pension recipient’s type 
and on the specific form of the pension benefit rule. Provided the rule incorporates 
some implicit or explicit redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals, the 
latter group will actually benefit from the existence of the social security system in 
the steady state. In contrast, if pension benefits are proportional to an individual’s 
contributions during youth and the proportionality factor is the same for everybody 
then the pension system makes everybody worse off in the long run.
A comparison of steady-state equilibria is not a guarantee that the privatization of 
social security is Pareto improving for all generations. For example, the simulations 
have shown that the abolition of a public pension system featuring a proportional 
benefit rule will harm shock-time healthy individuals. Even though all other genera-
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In this paper we have intentionally ignored the role of an intentional bequest 
motive and its effect on capital accumulation. Of course, the intention to leave 
bequests to one’s offspring does affect an individual’s attitude toward private annui-
ties. Indeed, with an operative bequest motive, the rational individual will no longer 
fully annuitize his/her assets. Despite the high return on private annuities the indi-
vidual will put aside a certain amount of unannuitized savings to pass on to their off-
spring upon death. In future work we intend to generalize the heterogeneous-agent 
model developed here by including an intentional bequest motive and to study the 
effects of social security with this extended framework.
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